Q11. SIMULATION
Create a RuntimeClass named untrusted using the prepared runtime handler named runsc.
Create a Pods of image alpine:3.13.2 in the Namespace default to run on the gVisor runtime class.
Verify: Exec the pods and run the dmesg, you will see output like this:-

Q12. SIMULATION
Use the kubesec docker images to scan the given YAML manifest, edit and apply the advised changes, and passed with a score of 4 points.
kubesec-test.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: kubesec-demo
spec:
containers:
– name: kubesec-demo
image: gcr.io/google-samples/node-hello:1.0
securityContext:
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
Hint: docker run -i kubesec/kubesec:512c5e0 scan /dev/stdin < kubesec-test.yaml

Q13. Context
The kubeadm-created cluster’s Kubernetes API server was, for testing purposes, temporarily configured to allow unauthenticated and unauthorized access granting the anonymous user duster-admin access.
Task
Reconfigure the cluster’s Kubernetes API server to ensure that only authenticated and authorized REST requests are allowed.
Use authorization mode Node,RBAC and admission controller NodeRestriction.
Cleaning up, remove the ClusterRoleBinding for user system:anonymous.

Q14. SIMULATION
Create a new ServiceAccount named backend-sa in the existing namespace default, which has the capability to list the pods inside the namespace default.
Create a new Pod named backend-pod in the namespace default, mount the newly created sa backend-sa to the pod, and Verify that the pod is able to list pods.
Ensure that the Pod is running.

Q15. You can switch the cluster/configuration context using the following command: [desk@cli] $ kubectl config use-context qa Context: A pod fails to run because of an incorrectly specified ServiceAccount Task: Create a new service account named backend-qa in an existing namespace qa, which must not have access to any secret. Edit the frontend pod yaml to use backend-qa service account Note: You can find the frontend pod yaml at /home/cert_masters/frontend-pod.yaml

Q16. Context
A default-deny NetworkPolicy avoids to accidentally expose a Pod in a namespace that doesn’t have any other NetworkPolicy defined.
Task
Create a new default-deny NetworkPolicy named defaultdeny in the namespace testing for all traffic of type Egress.
The new NetworkPolicy must deny all Egress traffic in the namespace testing.
Apply the newly created default-deny NetworkPolicy to all Pods running in namespace testing.

Q17. Service is running on port 389 inside the system, find the process-id of the process, and stores the names of all the open-files inside the /candidate/KH77539/files.txt, and also delete the binary.

Q18. Context: Cluster: gvisor Master node: master1 Worker node: worker1
You can switch the cluster/configuration context using the following command:
[desk@cli] $ kubectl config use-context gvisor
Context: This cluster has been prepared to support runtime handler, runsc as well as traditional one.
Task: Create a RuntimeClass named not-trusted using the prepared runtime handler names runsc. Update all Pods in the namespace server to run on newruntime.

Q19. Context
AppArmor is enabled on the cluster’s worker node. An AppArmor profile is prepared, but not enforced yet.

Task
On the cluster’s worker node, enforce the prepared AppArmor profile located at /etc/apparmor.d/nginx_apparmor.
Edit the prepared manifest file located at /home/candidate/KSSH00401/nginx-pod.yaml to apply the AppArmor profile.
Finally, apply the manifest file and create the Pod specified in it.

Q20. Using the runtime detection tool Falco, Analyse the container behavior for at least 20 seconds, using filters that detect newly spawning and executing processes in a single container of Nginx.
store the incident file art /opt/falco-incident.txt, containing the detected incidents. one per line, in the format
[timestamp],[uid],[processName]

Q21. Secrets stored in the etcd is not secure at rest, you can use the etcdctl command utility to find the secret value for e.g:- ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl get /registry/secrets/default/cks-secret –cacert=”ca.crt” –cert=”server.crt” –key=”server.key” Output

Using the Encryption Configuration, Create the manifest, which secures the resource secrets using the provider AES-CBC and identity, to encrypt the secret-data at rest and ensure all secrets are encrypted with the new configuration.

Q22. SIMULATION
On the Cluster worker node, enforce the prepared AppArmor profile
#include <tunables/global>
profile nginx-deny flags=(attach_disconnected) {
#include <abstractions/base>
file,
# Deny all file writes.
deny /** w,
}
EOF’
Edit the prepared manifest file to include the AppArmor profile.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: apparmor-pod
spec:
containers:
– name: apparmor-pod
image: nginx
Finally, apply the manifests files and create the Pod specified on it.
Verify: Try to make a file inside the directory which is restricted.

Q23. Cluster: qa-cluster Master node: master Worker node: worker1 You can switch the cluster/configuration context using the following command: [desk@cli] $ kubectl config use-context qa-cluster Task: Create a NetworkPolicy named restricted-policy to restrict access to Pod product running in namespace dev. Only allow the following Pods to connect to Pod products-service: 1. Pods in the namespace qa 2. Pods with label environment: stage, in any namespace

Q24. Enable audit logs in the cluster, To Do so, enable the log backend, and ensure that
1. logs are stored at /var/log/kubernetes/kubernetes-logs.txt.
2. Log files are retained for 5 days.
3. at maximum, a number of 10 old audit logs files are retained.
Edit and extend the basic policy to log:

Q25. Task
Create a NetworkPolicy named pod-access to restrict access to Pod users-service running in namespace dev-team.
Only allow the following Pods to connect to Pod users-service:

Q26. SIMULATION
Create a Pod name Nginx-pod inside the namespace testing, Create a service for the Nginx-pod named nginx-svc, using the ingress of your choice, run the ingress on tls, secure port.

Q27. SIMULATION
On the Cluster worker node, enforce the prepared AppArmor profile
#include <tunables/global>
profile docker-nginx flags=(attach_disconnected,mediate_deleted) {
#include <abstractions/base>
network inet tcp,
network inet udp,
network inet icmp,
deny network raw,
deny network packet,
file,
umount,
deny /bin/** wl,
deny /boot/** wl,
deny /dev/** wl,
deny /etc/** wl,
deny /home/** wl,
deny /lib/** wl,
deny /lib64/** wl,
deny /media/** wl,
deny /mnt/** wl,
deny /opt/** wl,
deny /proc/** wl,
deny /root/** wl,
deny /sbin/** wl,
deny /srv/** wl,
deny /tmp/** wl,
deny /sys/** wl,
deny /usr/** wl,
audit /** w,
/var/run/nginx.pid w,
/usr/sbin/nginx ix,
deny /bin/dash mrwklx,
deny /bin/sh mrwklx,
deny /usr/bin/top mrwklx,
capability chown,
capability dac_override,
capability setuid,
capability setgid,
capability net_bind_service,
deny @{PROC}/* w, # deny write for all files directly in /proc (not in a subdir)
# deny write to files not in /proc/<number>/** or /proc/sys/**
deny @{PROC}/{[^1-9],[^1-9][^0-9],[^1-9s][^0-9y][^0-9s],[^1-9][^0-9][^0-9][^0-9]*}/** w, deny @{PROC}/sys/[^k]** w, # deny /proc/sys except /proc/sys/k* (effectively /proc/sys/kernel) deny @{PROC}/sys/kernel/{?,??,[^s][^h][^m]**} w, # deny everything except shm* in /proc/sys/kernel/ deny @{PROC}/sysrq-trigger rwklx, deny @{PROC}/mem rwklx, deny @{PROC}/kmem rwklx, deny @{PROC}/kcore rwklx, deny mount, deny /sys/[^f]*/** wklx, deny /sys/f[^s]*/** wklx, deny /sys/fs/[^c]*/** wklx, deny /sys/fs/c[^g]*/** wklx, deny /sys/fs/cg[^r]*/** wklx, deny /sys/firmware/** rwklx, deny /sys/kernel/security/** rwklx,
}
Edit the prepared manifest file to include the AppArmor profile.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: apparmor-pod
spec:
containers:
– name: apparmor-pod
image: nginx
Finally, apply the manifests files and create the Pod specified on it.
Verify: Try to use command ping, top, sh

Q28. Create a RuntimeClass named gvisor-rc using the prepared runtime handler named runsc.
Create a Pods of image Nginx in the Namespace server to run on the gVisor runtime class

Q29. Fix all issues via configuration and restart the affected components to ensure the new setting takes effect.
Fix all of the following violations that were found against the API server:- a. Ensure the –authorization-mode argument includes RBAC b. Ensure the –authorization-mode argument includes Node c. Ensure that the –profiling argument is set to false Fix all of the following violations that were found against the Kubelet:- a. Ensure the –anonymous-auth argument is set to false.
b. Ensure that the –authorization-mode argument is set to Webhook.
Fix all of the following violations that were found against the ETCD:-
a. Ensure that the –auto-tls argument is not set to true
Hint: Take the use of Tool Kube-Bench

Q30. Using the runtime detection tool Falco, Analyse the container behavior for at least 20 seconds, using filters that detect newly spawning and executing processes in a single container of Nginx.